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C H A P T E R N I N E
THE RISE AND FALL OF TRADE AND
MONETARY LEGAL ORDERS: FROM
THE INTERWAR PERIOD TO TODAY’S
GLOBAL IMBALANCES
Gregory Shaffer and Michael Waibel
Many analysts of globalization see in the process of ‘legalization’ (Abbot
and Snidal, 2000) the tendency of informal rules to harden over time,
either because practice clarifies ambiguous rules over time, or because
institutions for dispute resolution are created to interpret and apply
them – a characteristic in the evolution of international legal orders.
The poster child for this development is the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and its Appellate Body created in 1995. In this chapter, we take
issue with this account of the purposeful character of the evolution of
transnational legal regimes at two levels.
First, we find that not all regimes of rules harden over time, but that
a process of de-legalization and the turn to informal law can weaken
or even eclipse hard multilateral rules. To illustrate this first point, we
trace the process of legalization of the monetary order from the League
of Nations to the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
which was followed by a process of de-legalization when the dollar lost
its parity to gold in the 1970s and the IMF had to re-invent a role for
itself other than that of the arbiter of a system of fixed exchange rates.
The post-1973 IMF has, or more precisely its member states have, lim-
ited interest in law, preferring instead to rely on soft law such as stan-
dards and codes to safeguard international financial stability. Formal-
ized dispute settlement has never featured prominently in the monetary
sphere.
Second, multilateral institutions often have overlapping jurisdiction.
We argue that the dual processes of legalization and de-legalization can
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challenge existing settlements and complementarities between inter-
national organizations, and that these changing equilibriums can add
another source of complexity (and sometimes uncertainty) to the gov-
ernance of the international economic system. To illustrate this sec-
ond point, we tell the parallel story of two organizations with overlap-
ping mandates but opposite trajectories: the WTO, where the creation
of a strong mechanism of dispute resolution started a process of judi-
cialization in the global trade regime in the mid 1990s and the IMF,
whose function shifted in the 1970s from being a multilateral insti-
tution charged with currency stabilization to an institution charged
with the surveillance of country-specific macro-economic policies. The
paper shows that, the degree of legalization today differs significantly
within the trade and monetary spheres, ranging from the use of formal
legal norms to informal means of cooperation. We argue that the dual
processes of judicialization and de-legalization have created zones of
obscurity in the overlapping areas where each organization could claim
jurisdiction before those shifts occurred.
To demonstrate these points, this chapter charts the rise and fall of
the legal orders in the trade and monetary spheres, the turn from dis-
cretion and informal means for macro-economic policy coordination
up to World War II and the gradual legalization of the trade legal order
until its rapid legalization and institutionalization in the WTO. The
first section shows that jurisdictional overlaps are largely a product of
the post-World War II era, as the League of Nations provided a com-
prehensive framework for both monetary and trade oversight, although
one that was not very legalized and was incapable of avoiding the back-
lash against free trade in the wake of World War I and the onslaught
of the Great Depression. We address the absence of lawyers within the
offices of the League in relation to the League’s failure to legalize its
regulatory regime, which reflected the fact that there was little posi-
tive law upon which legal arguments could be based during the inter-
war period, such that international economic law did not yet exist as
a distinct discipline. Indeed, there were virtually no legal rules govern-
ing international economic exchange aside from bilateral commercial
treaties.
The chapter shows why the architects of the post-WorldWar II order
had good reasons to opt for greater legalization and for creating two
separate but interrelated transnational legal orders at the multilateral
level: one for international monetary matters, and the other for inter-
national trade. Such functional legal differentiation was supposed to
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encourage institutions to focus on their comparatively narrow man-
dates, which they could then implement according to hard rules, cre-
ating two effective transnational legal orders for ordering international
trade and monetary affairs. By a transnational legal order, we refer to
a collection of formalized legal norms and associated organizations and
actors that authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law
across national jurisdictions (Halliday and Shaffer, 2015). The second
section shows that the decision by the Nixon administration to delink
the dollar from the price of gold and let the US currency float effec-
tively broke the system of hard rules that the IMF was to police. The
IMF had to reinvent a role for itself. This process of de-legalization had
implications that we explore in the third section.
The third section shows that at the same time that the IMF lost
its hard law jurisdiction over currency stabilization, and as it moved
into macro-economic policy advising, lending, and technical assistance
(functions which included advising countries on their specific trade
policies), the WTO evolved into an increasingly legalized and judi-
cialized institution for dispute resolution in the field of global trade.
The dual move of the IMF toward trade and macro-economic policy,
coupled with its de-legalization, and the judicialization of the WTO,
increased the uncertainty over the coherence of the system of interna-
tional economic rules. It raises the specter of misalignment between the
two transnational legal orders with real potential consequences. More
recently, bilateralism and new challenges arising at the interface of the
trade and monetary legal orders (such as currency misalignment) have
raised questions regarding the effectiveness of the trade legal order. We
argue in this section that the uneven effectiveness of the trade transna-
tional legal order is partly due to the trade order’s deference to the (now
weak) monetary legal order on issues regarding monetary relations and
the monetary legal order’s relative silence on the issues of exchange rate
undervaluation and capital controls on the capital account.
TRADE AND MONETARY DISORDER
BEFORE WORLD WAR II
The first era of globalization and its demise
The volume of world trade grew at a rapid and unprecedented pace in
the nineteenth century. The period 1870–1913 saw the birth of the first
era of trade globalization and the period 1914–1939 its death (Estevade-
ordal, Frantz and Taylor, 2003). Great Britain moved to free trade in the
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1840s, most notably with the repeal of the Corn Laws and the Anglo-
French Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860 that included a most favored
nation (MFN) clause. A network of similar bilateral trade treaties fol-
lowed, covering most of Europe. Free trade became the dominant doc-
trine. Before 1870, only a few countries adopted the gold standard.
As more countries adopted this multilateral commitment device, the
multilateral payments system based on gold convertibility underpinned
trade liberalization.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the international
trade and monetary order rested on established norms of international
conduct, rather than legal norms. The best example of the informal
arrangements that ordered the international economic system was the
gold standard. It ‘tended to make international payments more or less
automatic’ (Vagts, 2006, p. 770). At that time, international economic
law did not exist as a separate field. As a corollary, ‘exchange con-
trols were more or less unknown’ (Cooper 1967, p. 1276; Vagts, 2006,
p. 772). In the first golden era of global capital, from 1870 to 1914,
‘the flows of economic factors were largely unregulated’ (Vagts, 2006,
p. 782). That system of spontaneous international cooperation cou-
pled with the stability resulting fromGreat Britain’s financial hegemony
(Kindleberger, 1981) came to a sudden stop with World War I.
With the outbreak of World War I, tariffs, quotas, and other barriers
to trade multiplied (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007, p. 430). Concomi-
tantly,WorldWar I brought about a wave of exchange restrictions, such
as in German legislation of November 1915 (Gesetz über Verbot der
Ausfuhr und Durchfuhr von Gold, 1915). The war wreaked havoc on
the open international economic order. Blockades hampered trade not
only among belligerent countries, but also affecting neutral countries.
Shipping, central to the transportation of goods, was under constant
threat of attack, especially from German submarines. Transportation
and insurance costs rose sharply. Even Great Britain broke with free
trade by introducing the McKenna Tariff in 1915.
The gold standard and the international payment system it under-
pinned had ceased to function. When peace returned to the Euro-
pean continent, a legacy of protectionist policies hampered economic
reconstruction in Europe. Views among economic historians differ as to
whether the 1920s saw a normalization of trade policy towards greater
openness (Kindleberger, 1989). Some hold the view that ‘normalization
in commercial policy was more hoped for than achieved’ (Kindleberger,
1989, p. 163). After a brief sense of normalcy in the mid 1920s, the
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Great Depression delivered the deathblow to the first period of glob-
alization. The international trade and monetary system based on the
pre-war gold standard was gone by the mid 1930s. In 1933 the United
States went off the gold standard. Countries increasingly resorted to
exchange controls. If law played a role in dealing with these difficul-
ties, it was private international law, involving domestic courts hearing
commercial disputes among parties from multiple jurisdictions, rather
than public international law.
The debt overhang left behind by World War I
The cost of World War I was enormous and the treasuries of the coun-
tries that fought in it were severely depleted by 1919. Germany’s cur-
rency totally collapsed, triggering hyperinflation. The Versailles Treaty
failed to create the conditions for macroeconomic stability in Europe.
Many sectors of the economy were keen to retain the protection for
domestic production dating back to the war (Findlay and O’Rourke,
2007, p. 439). Most importantly, the Versailles Treaty failed to deal
decisively with the large debt overhang left byWorldWar I. Unsustain-
able levels of debt cast a long shadow over post-war economic recov-
ery. The protracted dispute over German reparations prompted France
to occupy the Ruhr in 1923. Germany and Austria then experienced
further hyperinflation. In Eastern Europe too, macroeconomic instabil-
ity was the order of the day. Against the background of these severe
tensions in the international economic system, central banks found it
much harder to cooperate compared to the pre-World War I period.
The US Congress created the World War Foreign Debt Commission
in February 1922 to offer a solution to the rapidly growing problem of
inter-governmental indebtedness (US Congress, 1922; United States
WorldWar Foreign Debt Commission, 1927, pp. 1–10). Due to the pre-
vailing economic conditions, many governments could not pay their
debts according to their terms. The United States realised it needed
to make some adjustments in the form of definite settlements to allow
national economies to recover. The Commission reduced the interest
payable and stretched thematurities. As a rule, however, it did not write
off any principal.
During theGreat Depression, all European countries, with the excep-
tion of Finland, defaulted on loans advanced by the United States to
aid their war effort. Many debtor governments pleaded their inability
to pay the full face value of their debts due to the effects of the world-
wide economic depression, which commenced in 1929. The capacity of
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the Allies to repay the United States depended on receiving German
war reparations, which were not forthcoming as promised. The finan-
cial quagmire illustrates the vicious circle of borrowing and inability to
pay that bedeviled inter-governmental fiscal relations in the interwar
period.
Bilateralism was also the order of the day in debt renegotiations.
The Commission’s task was not to supervise and implement a general
debt cancellation scheme, especially of the various European countries
among themselves. A global debt settlement could have achieved equal
treatment of debtor countries, and could have taken equitable consid-
erations related to these interlinkages into account in drawing up the
settlement (United StatesWorldWar Foreign Debt Commission, 1927,
pp. 1–10). An alternative to bilateral debt negotiations would have
been a multilateral joint settlement – an option that was less attrac-
tive to the United States that wished to preserve its own bargaining
power.
The debt overhang from World War I was partly responsible for a
series of banking crises in the late 1920s and early 1930s. This led to
a wave of sovereign defaults in Latin America. In early 1932, there
were isolated yet ultimately unsuccessful attempts to break with grow-
ing protectionism, most importantly in the World Economic Confer-
ence of 1933 in London. Globalization’s demise, however, was sealed
with Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, and Germany’s gearing up for war
and self-sufficiency. The underdeveloped international economic law of
the time was incapable of defusing these macro disputes – but the same
could also be said in respect of modern international trade law, which
has on the whole been able to resolve micro-level trade disputes focused
on specific sectors or products, but much less successful in dealing with
macro-level disputes such as global imbalances.
A tentative return to economic openness
The victoriousAllies insisted in the peace negotiations on the inclusion
of provisions regarding economic openness. In the Versailles Treaty,
Germany undertook not to discriminate against the Allies and Asso-
ciated States in respect of tariffs, customs regulations, internal charges,
export duties, and import as well as export prohibitions. The League of
Nations was an important player, especially its Economic and Finan-
cial Organization which moved quickly to re-establish some degree of
economic openness after the war had left the international economy
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shattered by restrictions on trading with the enemy and other impedi-
ments to trade.
This pattern of liberalization continued in the interwar period, not
just through the League of Nations but also more generally. A striking
feature of the work of the League of Nations in the economic and finan-
cial sphere was the absence of formal legal ordering. Lawyers played a
very limited role in the League’s operation. Even though the League
in general had a Legal Advisor who was a senior staff member, the
Economic Relations section was staffed virtually exclusively by non-
lawyers. In the interwar period, international lawyers produced no text-
book or other significant piece of writing on international economic
law. For all practical purposes, the discipline came into being only after
World War II.
Promises to abolish quantitative restrictions and lower tariffs given
in Brussels in 1920 and in Portorose in 1921 were not realized how-
ever. Not a single country ratified the Portorose Protocol (League of
Nations, 1944; Kindleberger, 1989; James, 2001; Findlay andO’Rourke,
2007, p. 443). The Genoa conference of 1922 urged a return to non-
discrimination and tariff barriers instead of quantitative barriers, but
without success. The League took up the subject, but to no avail. It
summarized the interwar experience with rising protectionism in the
following words: ‘the international conferences unanimously recom-
mended, and the great majority of Governments repeatedly proclaimed
their intention to pursue, policies designed to bring about conditions of
“freer and more equal trade;” yet never before in history were trade bar-
riers raised so rapidly or discrimination so generally practiced’ (League
of Nations, 1944, p. 101). TheGreat Depression only increased demand
for tariff protection in many countries, both industrialized and com-
modity producing ones. Deflation increased the barriers because tariffs
were fixed in nominal terms (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007, p. 447).
The League of Nations Covenant was not entirely silent on trade,
and the League did regularly produce studies on trade. Article 23(3) of
the Covenant bound member states to ‘maintain freedom of communi-
cations and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all
Members of the League’. However, this provision was an empty shell
given the qualification of the obligation in the chapeau of Article 23,
which provided that this obligation was ‘subject to and in accordance
with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter
agreed upon’. Thus, not only did the Covenant grandfather existing
commercial treaties, it also placed no restrictions whatsoever on the
295
GREGORY SHAFFER AND MICHAEL WAIBEL
ability of governments to enter into bilateral and preferential trade
and financial agreements.Many governments availed themselves of this
opportunity in the 1930s.
Furthermore, the League of Nations lacked compulsory, binding dis-
pute settlement, unlike the WTO today. Article 14 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations mandated the Council to develop plans for
a standing international court. The parties established a Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) three years later in 1922, but its
name was soon to prove inauspicious. The League could request advi-
sory opinions from the PCIJ, though they were only advisory, and not
binding on the parties, and were not backed by enforcement measures.
In practice, only one out of twenty-one advisory opinions rendered
by the PCIJ arguably concerned economic or financial matters. That
judgment, the PCIJ’s Advisory Opinion in Customs Regime between
Germany and Austria, centered on the question of whether Germany’s
and Austria’s plans to enter into a customs union at the height of the
Great Depression breachedAustria’s obligations under Article 88 of the
Saint-Germain-en-Laye Peace Treaty designed to guarantee Austria’s
political independence.
In addition, some of the Court’s contentious (non-advisory) cases
concerned economic and financial matters, most famously the Serbian
and Brazilian Loans cases. These two disputes, however, exclusively con-
cerned the application and interpretation of national law governing
sovereign bonds. Given the absence of economic and financial provi-
sions in the Covenant itself, the Court’s case law in the economic and
financial sphere bore mostly on the interpretation of the economic and
financial clauses of the Peace Treaties. Formalized legal dispute settle-
ment in general, and in economic and financial matters in particular,
played little role during the interwar period.
When the League sponsored new conventions that sought to facil-
itate the expansion of trade, the latter failed to be adequately imple-
mented. For instance, in 1927, countries signed an ambitious agreement
on the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions,
following a resolution of the League Assembly and a recommendation
of the International EconomicConference held at Geneva inMay 1927
(Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and
Restrictions, 1927; Vagts, 2006, p. 774). All major developed states,
including non-members of the League itself, such as the United States,
were signatories. The Convention contained a general prohibition on
prohibitions and restrictions on importation (Article 1) and provided
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for dispute settlement, but only with the agreement of the parties after
a dispute had arisen (Article 8). But the Convention was undermined
by a series of exceptions, including the general exception in Article 5
that allowed countries to restrict imports or exports ‘in extraordinary
and abnormal circumstances’, in order to protect ‘the vital interests
of the country’. States also attached a significant number of reserva-
tions. The Convention was short-lived. For example, the United States
and the United Kingdom withdrew from the Convention in the sum-
mer of 1933 (United States Department of State, 1933, pp. 783–786;
Irwin, 2011).
Backlash and retreat into economic autarky and
bilateralism in the interwar period
The Great Depression further revealed the weakness in the legaliza-
tion of the multilateral trade and financial orders provided by the post-
WWI treaties and League’s statutes. As regards trade, in the United
States, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 increased the barriers on
imports. It had a domino effect in other countries, leading to further tar-
iff increases. Great Britain increased tariffs on many imported goods in
1932 to 10 percent. Even before Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933,
Germany curtailed imports through exchange controls and licensing.
Autarky became in vogue virtually everywhere.
Up to the Great Depression and the banking crises in many countries
in its wake, most countries refrained from adopting capital controls.
However, capital controls mushroomed from the early 1930s, particu-
larly in response to capital flight related to banking crises. Argentina,
Austria, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Uruguay,
and Yugoslavia all adopted capital controls in 1931 (Mitchener and
Wandschneider, 2013). China and Italy followed in 1934, and the
United States applied capital controls from March 1933 to Novem-
ber 1934. Italy, for instance, introduced systematic capital controls to
alleviate a sustained balance of payments deficit. Even though coun-
tries such as Australia, Canada, India, Mexico, South Africa, Swe-
den, Switzerland, and the UK refrained from using capital controls in
the interwar period, by World War II, ‘hardly a country [was] without
exchange restrictions’ (Nussbaum, 1939, p. 448).
Neither formal nor informal norms were able to substantially stem
the rising tide of capital controls during this period. In reaction to the
growing number of capital controls, a couple of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation Treaties limited the freedom of states to adopt capital
297
GREGORY SHAFFER AND MICHAEL WAIBEL
TABLE 9.1 Selected capital controls in the interwar period
(United States Tariff Commission, 1943)
Country Types of capital controls introduced
Italy In 1925, initial curbs on speculative capital movements
through regulation. In May 1934, Italy prohibited any
transaction in foreign exchange except for the purpose of
financing effective trade and industry requirements or for
travelling abroad. Any purchase by Italian investors of
stocks and bonds issued abroad, as well as export of
banknotes and checks, were also prohibited. Increased
utilization of bilateral clearing agreements as a device for
circumventing the restrictive effects on international trade
of quotas and exchange rate controls.
Bulgaria In 1933, the Bulgarian National Bank raised interest rates
imposing further import restrictions to keep foreign capital
in Bulgaria and halt depletion of foreign reserves. Bulgaria
also concluded a series of bilateral clearing agreements.
Germany During the early 1930s, Germany created a complex system of
bilateral trade clearing agreements. German capital
controls were initially imposed to curb capital outflows and
maintained in order to keep the official foreign exchange
rates for the Reichsmark at the old parity; thereafter, an
extensive trade clearing system was created to offset the
distortions of the capital controls. In 1931, Germany also
introduced a flight tax to limit capital outflows.
controls (e.g. Greece–UK Treaty 1938). Others provided for the non-
discriminatory application of exchange restrictions, or most-favored
nation treatment with respect to foreign exchange restrictions (Shuster,
1973, pp. 98–100). The inclusion of these clauses was a response to the
rising tide of unilateralism in international monetary affairs in the
interwar period, including through capital controls. A small num-
ber of treaties prohibited the use of capital controls entirely, such as
the Czechoslovakia–USTradeAgreement (Article X, Czechoslovakia–
United States Trade Agreement, 1938), the Ecuador–US Trade Agree-
ment (Article X, Ecuador–United States Trade Agreement, 1938), the
Liberia–US trade agreement (Liberia–US Trade Agreement, 1938) and
the Greece–USTrade Agreement (Article X, Greece–USTrade Agree-
ment, 1938), but overall they had little global impact.
To be able to maintain trade relationships with countries that had
imposed capital controls, countries increasingly entered into various
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clearing and transfer arrangements that ‘facilitated the transfer of funds
from one country to another in such a manner as to maintain the bal-
ance of payments between the two countries in a state of reasonable
equilibrium’. (Hahn, 1990, pp. 310–313, p. 128.) Countries competed
with one another to enter into bilateral clearing agreements to preserve
their export market shares. Increasingly, capital controls not only sup-
ported the balance of payments. Governments also relied on them to
give preferential treatment to certain sectors of the economy, and to
restrict expensive imports.
As the multilateral regime fractured, countries increasingly turned to
bilateral agreements to preserve their export markets. For example, in
the United States, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 gave
authority to the President to negotiate agreements for the reciprocal
reduction of tariffs. Renewed in 1937, 1940, 1943, and 1945, theUnited
States entered into thirty-two such agreements under this authority
(Vagts, 2006, p. 775). In the 1930s, Germany entered into a series of
preferential agreements for the supply of raw materials, especially with
countries in Eastern and Southern Europe that suffered from balance of
payments difficulties. In this way, Germany secured access to raw mate-
rial at preferential prices. This web of bilateral trade deals proliferated,
involving Germany and other colonial empires such as Great Britain,
including under Great Britain’s Imperial Preference system established
at Ottawa in 1932. This ‘pernicious bilateralism’ left theMFN principle
as an empty shell (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007, p. 451). As the League
of Nations reported, ruefully looking back at the limited impact of the
MFN clause in the interwar period: ‘instead of facilitating, the [MFN]
clause tended to obstruct the reduction of tariffs by means of bilateral
or multilateral agreements, owing to the reluctance of governments to
make concessions which would be generalized by it. This was the result,
mainly of two causes: first, the refusal of the United States to reduce
its own very high tariff by negotiation while claiming to benefit from
any tariff reduction negotiated between European countries; secondly,
the opposition of certain countries – notably the United Kingdom, the
United States, and the British Dominions – to derogations from strict
MFN practice permitting the conclusion of regional or similar agree-
ments for tariff reduction, the benefits of which would be limited to the
participants’ (League of Nations, 1944, p. 119).
The Tripartite Agreement of 1936, under which France, Great
Britain, and the United States agreed to consult on any changes in
exchange rates, was a very soft precursor to the Bretton Woods System
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of fixed exchange rates. The three signatory countries pledged to con-
sult with one another in advance. The IMF, by contrast, would later
establish hard legal obligations on countries to adhere to fixed exchange
rates backed by gold, and have a much broader membership.
To sum up, following the catastrophic experience ofWorldWar I and
the enormous human and economic costs of the war, countries struggled
to return to the pre-war normalcy in international economic relations.
They succeeded somewhat at first, however imperfectly, but within the
space of a bit more than a decade, the economic and political challenges
became almost insurmountable, and the world economy relapsed into
autarky. Despite being a comparatively strong international institution
for its time, the League of Nations was ultimately powerless to pre-
vent the backlash against economic openness in the interwar period.
As we have seen, this failure may have been linked to the fact that
international economic law as a distinct discipline did not exist in the
interwar period, and that there were virtually no legal rules govern-
ing international economic exchange, aside from bilateral commercial
treaties. To the extent formalized legal rules existed in the interwar
period in the monetary and trade sphere, they were bilateral in char-
acter. The absence of multilateral disciplines led to widespread beggar-
thy-neighbor policies. Non-discrimination, which had been central to
the first golden era of globalization before World War I, was emascu-
lated by the proliferation of bilateral trade agreements. The interna-
tional trading system was dominated by an economic system based on
preferential agreements – the most notorious example being Britain’s
imperial preferences for trade with its colonies and dominions.
Even though the contours of a distinct field started to emerge in the
early twentieth century, the world had to wait until the institutional-
ization of the Bretton Woods institutions following World War II, for
international trade to receive a multilateral legal frame.
THE RISE AND DECLINE IN LEGALIZATION OF THE
MONETARY LEGAL ORDER: FROM WORLD WAR II
TO THE 1970S
From the disastrous turn towards autarky and economic nationalism in
the trade andmonetary sphere during the interwar period, a strong com-
mitment to a multilateral monetary order emerged after 1945. Leading
policy makers, led by those in the United States and UK such as Harry
Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes in particular, found that a
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robust multilateralism was necessary for prosperity and growth. Out of
the ashes of World War II arose a new spirit of cooperation, not only in
the political sphere with the creation of theUnitedNations as successor
to the League of Nations, but also in international economic relations
with the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions. The trade
regime followed, but took longer than the monetary regime to be for-
malized, with theWorld Trade Organization only being formed in 1995
as the successor to the 1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) following the Cold War’s end.
The legalization of the monetary and trade orders from
1945 to the 1970s
In the preparations for the Bretton Woods conference, policymakers
considered a unified organization for global economic governance on
the model of the League of Nations (Dubin, 1983). In the Interwar
Period, in some sense a peak organization (the League of Nations)
addressed the different, but complementary, functions of international
monetary stability and trade liberalization. The Economic and Finan-
cial Organization persistently advocated trade liberalization and the
coordination of member state policies in the monetary sphere, but also
without much success (Clavin, 2013). But it largely operated in the
absence of formalized legal rules in either the trade or monetary sphere.
Moreover, the organization was not universal and did not include all
the important powers, most importantly, the United States, but also
Germany and Italy after their withdrawal from the organization in
1933.
Thus, the Bretton Woods architects concluded that the League may
not be the best model to replicate after World War II, as the trade and
monetary non-order of the interwar period was characterized by ‘com-
petitive currency devaluations, excessive tariff barriers, uneconomic
barter deals, multiple currency practices and unnecessary exchange
restrictions’ (U.S. State Department, 1948, p. 1226). The stated aim
of the peak organizations of the trade and monetary legal orders since
WorldWar II – the GATT/WTO and the IMF – is to confine these ‘des-
perate tactics of the past’ to the dustbin of history. Instead of one, the
framers of the Bretton Woods financial and trade framework decided
to create two separate organizations, the IMF and an International
Trade Organization, the latter not being formed because of US resis-
tance and being substituted by the ‘provisional’ GATT. This decision
would raise issues regarding the interface of these two legal orders and
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how they align in areas of overlapping jurisdiction, as Article I of the
IMF Articles of Agreement includes not only financial stabilization,
but also trade expansion, among the ‘purposes’ of the IMF: its goals are
‘to promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent
institution’, ‘facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of trade’,
‘promote exchange stability’, ‘maintain orderly exchange arrangements
among members’, and ‘avoid competitive exchange depreciation’. This
definition parallels the purpose of the GATT, and its successor, the
WTO, which is to facilitate agreement among the organization’s mem-
bers for a liberalized trading order, and to oversee, monitor, and facili-
tate the maintenance of such order, including through legalized dispute
settlement.
Still, the decision of states to opt for functional differentiation into
separate trade and monetary regimes was largely due to the lessons that
the architects of Bretton Woods drew from the comprehensive failures
of macro-economic policy coordination in the interwar period. Func-
tionally differentiated regimes, built on a higher degree of formaliza-
tion, were to provide a stronger foundation for effective international
economic governance. The IMF during the Bretton Woods system was
at the center of overseeing and policing a system of fixed exchange
rates. As the guardian of international monetary stability and the cen-
tral mechanism for exchange rate coordination, the IMF had a compar-
atively narrow mandate. The greater focus of its work, compared to the
League of Nations, may well have been an important ingredient in its
higher degree of effectiveness as an international organization. Vesting
narrow mandates in separate peak organizations is a perfectly under-
standable strategy in light of the failure of the League of Nations in the
economic and financial sphere. Furthermore, following World War II,
the new international monetary system was underpinned by a series of
multilateral legal commitments, embodied chiefly in the IMF Articles
of Agreement. This new monetary order was placed on a treaty foot-
ing, in contrast to the League, which had pinned its hopes for macro-
economic policy coordination on informal coordination by providing
economic expertise and a forum for political exchange among national
economic policymakers. The contemporary Bank for International
Settlement, created in 1930, and to a significant degree the IMF after
1971, fit into the same mould.
The original architects of the Bretton Woods system, in particular,
were wary of unchecked capital flows, and wished to retain room for
states to address financial instability and crises. But they did not vest
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such authority in the IMF, partly because there was consensus among
professional economists regarding the desirability of capital controls
(Chwieroth, 2010). Nurske, the leading economist at the League of
Nations working on the international monetary system in the inter-
war period, commenced in 1942 to write ‘an historical account of
the interwar experience of monetary problems . . .with the objective of
determining some principles of future monetary arrangements’ (Clavin,
2013, p. 309). This led to Nurske’s famous work International Currency
Experience: Lessons of the Interwar Period (1944).
His book was highly influential and played a central role in shaping
the Bretton Woods negotiations for creating the IMF andWorld Bank.
It establishes the need for monetary order, and sought to avoid a repeat
of the spaghetti bowl of capital controls and bilateral clearing agree-
ments that had helped unravel the international economic system in
the interwar period. Even more so than Nurske, the lead negotiators at
Bretton Woods, Harry Dexter White for the United States and Keynes
for the British, had long been concerned about the risks of ‘hot money’
to national and global financial stability, based primarily on the disas-
trous experience with free capital mobility in the 1920s in the lead up
to the Great Depression. Keynes and White were both particularly sus-
picious of private capital flows. According to Keynes ‘control of capital
movements, both inward and outward, should be a permanent feature
of the post-war system’, a sentiment echoed by White who thought ‘a
good case could be made for . . . the [government’s] power to control the
influx and efflux of capital’ (Steil, 2013, p. 145). U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury Henry Morgenthau even rejoiced that the IMF was located
at a distance from Wall Street, and thus would ‘drive . . . the usurious
money lenders from the temple of international finance’ (Steil, 2013,
p. 167). Morgenthau and his fellow New Dealers wanted an interna-
tional financial system centered on the US Treasury, rather than one in
the hands of private financiers, either on Wall Street or in the City of
London.
The original IMF Articles of Agreement thus prioritized currency
stability over capital mobility, and left untouched the ability of coun-
tries to regulate and restrict capital account transactions. Accordingly,
the IMF Articles subject only current account transactions to the IMF’s
jurisdiction (such as those related to trade in goods), so that IMF mem-
bers are free to restrict all capital account transfers (such as portfo-
lio investment), provided these restrictions do not unduly delay cur-
rent transactions (Article VI.3). The IMF Articles did not formally
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recognize the ability of states to impose capital controls in hard law,
but permitted their introduction by their silence.
The framers of the Bretton Woods architecture knew that the estab-
lishment of a legalized framework facilitating the expansion of global
trade would be arduous. In effect, it took several decades to disman-
tle the protectionist legacy of the two world wars and the interwar
period, and the IMF was only one cause among many others (includ-
ing, decolonization). One contemporary commentator wrote of the
newly established International Monetary Fund: ‘World trade cannot
be restored and expanded unless the United Nations abandons the
restrictive and discriminatory currency practices that became so preva-
lent in the 1930’s. Their very existence is a threat to friendly economic
relations. The International Fund, established to deal with this prob-
lem of currency warfare, is intended to facilitate the full flow of trade by
promoting stable and orderly exchange arrangements. The members of
the Fund have undertaken to maintain fair currency standards, under
which trade can expand and grow’ (Pehle, 1946, pp. 1127–1139, 1129).
But as long as imperial states (such as the UK and France) main-
tained systems of preferential trade with their colonies, the IMF could
do little, and promoters of free trade would need to use various pol-
icy instruments. For the United States, one of the key objectives at
the Bretton Woods conference was the abolition of imperial prefer-
ences and the creation of a level playing field. Britain fought a rear-
guard and ultimately an unsuccessful action to defend the colonial sys-
tem and imperial preferences. The United States used its leverage from
its lending to Britain under the Lend-Lease program to pressure the UK
to abandon these preferences that privileged trade between the UK and
its colonies. With the GATT, the United States aimed to institution-
alize the removal of such trade discrimination, although it would take
some time (Zeiler, 1997).
Between 1945 and 1971, the IMF was in many ways the world’s most
influential and independent international organization. It oversaw an
exchange rate system in which all currencies were pegged to the US
dollar, which was, in turn, backed by gold at $35 per ounce. Under the
Bretton Woods system, coordinated activist monetary and fiscal policy
with a view to remedying balance of payments imbalances replaced gold
flows under the gold standard to which countries had tried to return
during the interwar period, or automatic adjustment through floating
exchange rates. By and large, the Bretton Woods system managed to
internalize the externalities arising from monetary policy.
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In the words of its former General Counsel Joseph Gold (1990, p. 2),
the original par value system overseen by the IMF was ‘unprecedented
as a system for regulating the exchange rates of currencies under a
multilateral treaty administered by an international organization’. The
IMF rules on exchange rates were strict and states generally abided by
them. Central banks regularly intervened in foreign exchange markets
to maintain the pegs, and in practice, the pegs were rarely changed. The
government treasury/central bank (depending on the national system)
committed to exchange domestic currency for foreign currency at the
par value. With a system of pegged exchange rates, there was no room
for currency manipulation, unlike in the interwar period and from the
1970s onwards. Under the policies of embedded liberalism of the Bret-
tonWoods system, countries maintained capital controls to provide sta-
bility and enhance their ability to develop social welfare systems.
The trade order was longer in the making than the monetary legal
order, but its establishment also originated from the immediate post-
war context. Unlike the IMF, the GATT was a weak organization when
it began in 1948 as a ‘provisional’ agreement. The GATT nonetheless
contained a series of detailed legal rules on trade in goods, as well as
clear non-discrimination provisions (GATT Articles I on MFN treat-
ment and GATT Article III on national treatment) that over time
helped bury the preferential, bilateral legacy of the Interwar Period for
trade in goods. The GATT brought about a secular decline in applied
tariff rates through negotiated tariff ceilings.
The de-legalization of the monetary order and the collapse
of the Bretton Woods system
The Bretton Woods system collapsed in the early 1970s when the
United States unilaterally ended the dollar’s convertibility to gold and
imposed an across-the-board tariff increase of 10 percent (Gardner,
1985). The dollar, as a result, became a fiat currency, one no longer
backed by gold or any other precious metal. The Bretton Woods sys-
tem of pegged exchange rates rapidly gave way to a world of national
choice of exchange arrangements, with the United States and other
major economies moving to floating exchange rates, subject to periodic
government interventions.
Europe was more ambivalent about the move to floating exchange
rates, at least insofar as it concerned fluctuations of European currencies
against each other. In 1969, the heads of state of the EEC first called for
the progressive creation of an economic and monetary union, and the
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EECCouncil created the so-called ‘snake’ in 1972, which operated out-
side the formal EEC Treaty. Pursuant to it, the members’ central banks
were to coordinate the management of their currencies within narrow
margins of fluctuation against the dollar. The ‘snake’ quickly failed, a
casualty of the breakup of the BrettonWoods system, but it represented
a predecessor of the European Rate Mechanism of the European Mon-
etary System (EMS) established in 1978, to be subsequently followed
by the creation of a single currency for seventeen European states, the
Euro.
Another way of viewing the change following the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system is that political and market ordering displaced
legal ordering. Legal ordering of trade and monetary relations, certainly
on a multilateral level, was substantially new following World War II.
As we have seen in Section I, no comparable legal order existed in the
interwar period; and the stability of the pre-WorldWar I system resulted
from informal cooperation, largely among central banks, rather than
legalized ordering in the modern sense. Pre-1914 and post-1989, mar-
kets determined the value of floating currencies, although with impor-
tant exceptions, such as the People’s Republic of China on account of
its market interventions.
Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF’s role
significantly decreased as regards developed economies. This secular
decline of the monetary legal order echoes the weakening of the infor-
mal monetary legal order that developed in the first golden period for
global capital in the late nineteenth century. The Banque de France,
the Bank of England, and the German Reichsbank were the central
decision-makers in international economic affairs at the beginning of
the twentieth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the
United States was absent from this exclusive club as Congress estab-
lished the Federal Reserve system only in 1913.
The percentage of lawyers among the staff of an international orga-
nization provides a rough proxy for the degree of legalization of a legal
order. In the case of the League of Nations – apart from its work in the
political sphere where lawyers played at times an influential role – the
number of lawyers providing legal advice was close to zero. A substan-
tial percentage of League staff had trained as lawyers. Yet their role at
the League, by and large, was not to provide legal advice. Rather, like
all other staff, they were mostly engaged in providing policy advice and
report on the state of the economies of League member countries. A
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good example is Leon Bourgeois, a lawyer by training who was elected
the first President of the Council of the League. For the IMF today
(which has been the case since its creation in 1945), the percentage of
lawyers working for the organization is around 3 percent (around fifty
lawyers out of a total professional staff of about 2,000).
Another way of evaluating the role of law in an international orga-
nization is to attempt to measure the influence of lawyers on the policy-
making process. There is little doubt that lawyers influence the policy-
making process more directly and more frequently at the WTO than
at the IMF or in the League of Nations. On the whole, the IMF Legal
Department is not centrally involved in the formation of policy-making
at the Fund, even though it plays a central role in ensuring compli-
ance with Fund policies and has increasingly been involved in provid-
ing technical assistance to IMF member countries on matters as diverse
as effective corporate insolvency frameworks, the formulation of central
banking statutes, and financial regulation. Economists play the domi-
nant roles in the IMF on matters of policy generally and for the IMF
surveillance missions in particular.
From the early 1970s, the IMF’s primary function changed from being
coordinator and potential enforcer of an international monetary system
of rules-based pegged exchange rates, to being a surveillance organi-
zation that issues country reports regarding a country’s economic and
balance-of-payments situation, and a lender and adviser for developing
countries facing balance-of-payments problems. In the contemporary
world of floating exchange rates, there are few monetary rules left for
the IMF to police and enforce. This return of the monetary legal order
to informality and central bank coordination harks back to the interwar
period.
Whereas the creation of the IMF resulted in considerable exchange
rate stability for the duration of the Bretton Woods system of fixed
exchange rates so that the interface of the trade and monetary legal
orders raised a few questions, that interface became much more chal-
lenging as regards global imbalances and exchange rates following the
collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangement and the turn to floating
exchange rates by the world’s major economies in the 1970s. IMF
Article IV now permits countries to choose their exchange arrange-
ments, subject to IMF surveillance and member compliance with a
series of principles that are rather soft in nature and in practice. As
Andreas Lowenfeld (2010, p. 582) writes, ‘the fundamental rule [of
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pegged exchange rates] was replaced by a non-rule’ (emphasis added).
Law receded as a means to resolve conflicts between debtor and surplus
countries.
The revised IMFArticles (of 1978) create onlyminimal legal require-
ments, ones that are difficult to apply and enforce in practice. The
preamble to revised Article IV provides that ‘each member under-
takes to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly
exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange
rates’. Section 1(iii) of Article IV provides, ‘in particular’, thatmembers
shall ‘avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary
system in order to prevent effective balance-of-payments adjustment or
to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members’. The legal
standard for showing ‘manipulation’ is a delicate one because it includes
both objective and subjective criteria – that of government interven-
tion in exchange markets, and that of a country’s intent. The IMF has
never made such a finding.
Pursuant to Article IV, the IMF adopted a surveillance system to
ensure members’ compliance with their obligations, and thereby pro-
tect the stability of the global monetary system. Article IV, Section
3(a) mandates that the IMF shall ‘oversee the international monetary
system in order to ensure its effective operation, and shall oversee the
compliance of each member with its obligations under Section 1 of this
Article’.
Members are to cooperate fully with the IMF and, to this end, ‘shall
provide the Fund with the information necessary’, and ‘when requested
by the Fund, shall consult with it on the member’s exchange rate poli-
cies’ (Article IV.3.b.). In 1977, the IMF Executive Board adopted a
‘Decision on Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies’ which estab-
lished several factors that the Fundmust consider ‘whichmight indicate
the need for discussion with a member’ (IMF Executive Board Decision
1977). Included in these factors is ‘protracted large-scale intervention
in one direction in exchange markets’. In this way, the IMF can attempt
to use the shadow of IMF rules to persuade countries to change their
behavior.
As Rosa Lastra writes, ‘[f]rom being a virtually self-enforcing arrange-
ment subject to strict rules, surveillance now becomes a function in
which judgment is of the essence. Surveillance is no longer a rules-
based regime but a “discretion based regime”’ (emphasis added) (Lastra,
2006, p. 400). The monetary legal order for exchange rate governance
had largely folded. That left it ill-equipped to deal with new challenges,
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such as increasingly frequent allegations of currency misalignment and
manipulation. Currency misalignment and manipulation was a cen-
tral factor in the fracturing of international cooperation in the inter-
war period, and would once more pose a major challenge following the
financial crisis and so-called Global Recession of 2008.
In practice, the role of the IMF has been very limited, leaving an
important gap in the institution whose mandate is to safeguard global
financial stability. The Fund has initiated and conducted formal consul-
tations with members regarding their exchange rate policy only twice,
on an ad hoc basis, with Sweden in 1982 and South Korea in 1987
(Goldstein, 2006, p. 150). In both cases, the IMF did not make a find-
ing that the country was unlawfully manipulating its currency, but only
consulted with it in order to induce it to change its domestic practices.
On global imbalances, the world similarly lacks hard legal rules, just
like in the interwar period. When disputes arose following the col-
lapse of Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, governments
used diplomacy and political pressure to coordinate a realignment of
exchange rates, as reflected in the 1985 Plaza Accord – similar to the
1936 Tripartite Agreement for exchange rate coordination between the
UK, France, and the United States.
Under the Plaza Accord of 1985, the United States, United King-
dom, France, Japan, and West Germany collectively intervened in cur-
rency markets to induce an appreciation of the yen and deutsche mark,
and thereby help stem protectionist pressures from the private sector for
restrictive trademeasures in theUnited States. They did so, however, in
a particular geopolitical context in which Japan and Europe depended
on the US security umbrella in the context of the Cold War, and the
United States exercised greater market power than it does today.
Formal dispute settlement likewise plays no role in international
monetary law under the IMF today. Even though the IMF Articles
contain binding rules, and the IMF in theory can impose sanctions
to enforce them, such as withdrawing eligibility of a member’s access
to Fund resources, suspending its voting rights, or even compelling
it to withdraw from the Fund, in reality, ineligibility for funds and sus-
pension of voting rights are rare occurrences in Fund practice, and no
country has yet been forced out of the IMF. The Fund, moreover, lacks
a formal dispute settlement system. Rather the Fund relies on con-
sultations with IMF members where IMF authority is based on Fund
professional ‘expertise’, and, if applicable, any leverage the Fund has
over a country in financial difficulty, as in the context of IMF financing
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arrangements. Although some of the IMF’s legal provisions are formally
hard, they are in practice rather soft, in particular because their enforce-
ment depends on consultations (Gold, 1982).
Although IMF members attempted to elaborate new rules to address
exchange rate controversies in the 2000s, the rules remained weak in
practice. There has been a similar turn towards informality in interna-
tional finance more generally. Even though international monetary law
retains a bedrock of hard legal rules, international monetary law is curi-
ously silent about the major risk to global monetary stability – private
international finance, where soft law predominates.
POST-1989 : MISALIGNMENT, FRAGMENTATION
AND POSSIBLE ECLIPSE
After 1989: the judicialization of WTO and the
de-legalization of the IMF
When the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed, ideas of
market liberalization triumphed, reflected in the rise of the ‘Washing-
ton consensus’, a term coined in 1989 regarding neoliberal reform pack-
ages advocated by international financial institutions and other pol-
icy makers for developing countries to become more market-oriented
(Williamson, 1990). The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which
had been initiated in 1988, concluded with the agreement to create,
for the first time, a formal international trade organization, the WTO,
in 1995. Following the WTO’s formation, the trade legal order reached
the height of its influence. The WTO expanded the trade order’s legal
scope to include an array of new agreements covering non-tariff barriers,
services, and intellectual property protection. The WTO’s geographic
scope continued to expand significantly, as its membership grew to 161
byMay 2015, including China and Russia that joined in 2001 and 2012
respectively.
Under the post-ColdWar trade legal order, WTO dispute settlement
panels and the WTO Appellate Body issue legal rulings are binding on
the parties to the dispute. These rulings are likewise regularly cited for
their interpretations and applications of WTO law in subsequent dis-
putes and rulings. If the respondent fails to comply with a ruling, the
complainant has the option to enforce it through withdrawing trade
concessions in an equivalent amount, something unthinkable in the
IMF context. The WTO system also provides mechanisms for consul-
tations and peer review that can facilitate compliance, but they exist
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and operate in parallel and in the shadow of the formal WTO dispute
settlement system.
TheWTO system has become much more legalized than the original
GATT and is now built on a hard law model that can affect delibera-
tions in its soft law-type forums. WTO members filed 492 cases before
the WTO dispute settlement system as of May 2015. WTO hard law
thus exercises a much greater shadow effect on interactions within the
WTO committee system. This judicialization of the trading order has
curtailed the power of diplomats in favor of lawyers (Weiler, 2002), and
potentially made it more challenging to reconcile the trade and mone-
tary organizational cultures.
This increased legalization is reflected in the rising percentage of
lawyers among the staff of the WTO: the percentage of lawyers at the
WTO today is higher than before (WTO Annual Report, 2013). The
number and role of lawyers has risen significantly within theWTO sec-
retariat compared to under the GATT. With the decline of negotiating
activity in theWTO and the ongoing importance of formalized dispute
settlement, the WTO’s Legal Affairs division (servicing all dispute set-
tlement panels other than for import relief matters), the Rules divi-
sion (servicing all panels on antidumping, subsidy, and safeguard relief
matters), and the Appellate Body division (hearing appeals of all panel
decisions), have risen in importance.
The rise of the influence of lawyers in the modern trade legal order is
a recent phenomenon. The GATT Director General laid the seeds for
the increasing influence of legal professionals when he created a small
legal affairs division of three lawyers within the secretariat in 1982.
This staffing of GATT dispute settlement panels with lawyers reflected
and facilitated the move towards a more legalized dispute settlement
system. With the WTO’s creation in 1995, WTO members created a
compulsory dispute settlement system to interpret and apply its legal
requirements and authorize enforcement measures. No longer could a
defendant unilaterally block the creation of a panel or the adoption of
a panel report. The role of lawyers in the WTO secretariat accordingly
rose.
Both the WTO agreements and the IMF Articles – whose reach
was widest during the Bretton Woods period – formally imposed hard
law obligations, but today, the density of hard rules differs consider-
ably. Whereas the WTO agreements contain hundreds of pages of legal
rules, backed by a formalized dispute settlement system, the number of
hard law obligations in the IMF Articles is small. The result has been
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coordination challenges in key areas affecting the interface of the two
regimes, and in particular regarding the issue of currency manipulation
when a WTO member intervenes on the currency markets or other-
wise engages in macro-economic policies that depreciate its currency
and provide commercial advantages to its domestic producers in inter-
national trade.
In contrast to the process of judicialization that has taken place in
theWTO, the IMF has beenmore andmore sidelined as a possible third
party in international financial and commercial disputes over issues that
fall under its jurisdiction, as illustrated by the recent evolution of the
regulatory framework over capital controls. As said before, the founders
of the BrettonWoods architecture had been very wary about the desta-
bilizing effects of the free flow of capital, but the IMF did not create a
clear system of hard law over the issue. Over the last decade, the implied
authorization for capital controls that is inscribed in the IMF Articles
has been increasingly overridden by bilateral free trade and investment
agreements. The first step in this turn to bilateralism was a generalized
move away from capital controls. During the 1970s and 1980s, US offi-
cials reversed their views on capital controls. In 1972, theUnited States
announced for the first time at an IMF meeting that it opposed capital
controls and would remove its own by the end of 1974. US officials
then led a movement to overturn Keynesian views towards capital con-
trols in the IMF and abroad. In the 1990s, the United States targeted
controls that particularly affected the US financial sector (Chwieroth,
2010, p. 146).
This shift of views in the United States would soon lead to a domino
effect in Europe and subsequently elsewhere. During the late 1980s and
the 1990s, a new regional legal order emerged in Europe that provided
for the elimination of capital controls. Under the Maastricht Treaty
on European Union in 1993, European Union Law prohibited capital
controls, and free capital mobility has since been further entrenched
in EU law (now Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU). Today, ‘the very definition of a “European”
state includes a commitment to capital mobility’ (Abdelal, 2007, p. 83).
This prohibition of capital controls underpins the European Monetary
Union.
During the 1990s, the IMF too became increasingly receptive to the
liberalization of global finance. IMF management and staff appeared
to lead the charge as part of a neoliberal ideological turn, despite
resistance from some of the IMF’s membership, especially developing
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countries (Abdelal, 2007). First, the Second Amendment to the IMF
Articles in 1978 partially constrained countries’ seemingly unqualified
right to impose capital controls (under Article VI) by extending the
IMF’s surveillance function (under Article IV) to address the implica-
tions of national measures for global financial stability in a system with-
out multilaterally fixed exchange rates. In its surveillance and technical
assistance, IMF staff advocated and spurred countries to liberalize their
capital controls, as well as to adopt financial standards and codes built
largely from US and UK models (Chwieroth, 2010).
In the mid 1990s, IMF management, supported by developed coun-
try members of the Executive Board, pushed for an amendment of the
IMF Articles to grant the IMF explicit jurisdiction over capital account
transactions. The Executive Board approved a mandate to work on
a new amendment to promote capital account liberalization through
which countries’ capital accounts would be progressively liberalized,
just as their current accounts had been earlier (Fischer, 1998). The
East Asian crisis of 1998 undermined these efforts. Developing coun-
tries opposed the IMF initiative almost in block. In September 1998,
Malaysia banned all international capital transfers for one year to pre-
vent contagion from the devaluation of the Thai baht. Its decision
attracted considerable controversy, as it went against economic ortho-
doxy of the time, but the decision is nowwidely considered to have been
a prudent measure (Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001). India and China contin-
ued to maintain limited openness in their capital account, and unlike
many of their Asian peers, were spared serious banking and financial
crises. The IMF quietly shelved its initiative and then altered its posi-
tion over capital controls after being severely chastened for its handling
of the crisis (Blustein, 2012).
Whenmultilateral initiatives to guarantee free capital mobility failed
to make much headway, the United States and some countries in
Europe, lobbied by their financial sectors, became active in negotiat-
ing mostly bilateral free trade and investment agreements that restrict
the use of capital controls and lead to patchwork liberalization of cap-
ital accounts through the backdoor (Waibel, 2009). Bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) with free trans-
fer clauses are misaligned with the monetary legal order when it comes
to addressing financial crises. Unlike the WTO’s General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS), the great majority of these clauses do not
refer to the IMFArticles of Agreement, nor foresee any role for the IMF
and its expertise in assessing whether restrictions on capital account are
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justified on balance-of-payments grounds. German and US BITs typi-
cally do not even contain a balance-of-payments exception. By con-
trast, ASEAN member countries learned painful lessons in the Asian
financial crisis of 1998, and these lessons are reflected in the detailed
exceptions to the free transfer provisions in the ASEAN Comprehen-
sive Investment Agreement of 2009 (Desierto, 2012). The agreement
contains extensive references to the IMF Articles in order to justify the
imposition of capital controls.
These BITs and FTAs also grant private rights to investors to enforce
the commitments through investor-state arbitration, so that host states
become liable for compensation to investors when they impose trans-
fer restrictions. The threat of such investment disputes can change the
calculus of governments and chill the use of capital controls. The turn
away from informality and towards enforceability of norms of free cap-
ital mobility in BITs and FTAs risks restricting policy space for gov-
ernments. Provided these norms guaranteeing free capital mobility are
effective, they will prevent a vicious circle of capital controls. Notwith-
standing, on the basis of the experience in the interwar period, these
bilateral agreements may go too far by ruling out an instrument of
macro-economic policy management that may be necessary, in extreme
cases, to prevent rapid capital flight, such as in Iceland inOctober 2008.
It also leads to fragmentation in the international monetary order based
on competition for market access rather than policy coordination.
Thus, today, we observe further differentiation on geographic lines
within the trade and monetary legal orders, resulting in growing frag-
mentation. Regional and bilateral alternatives and complements to the
multilateral regime have risen to prominence, especially since the Doha
Round of trade negotiations stalled and since the failure to create amul-
tilateral regime for investment – theMultilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment, or MAI). For example, today the WTO, the EU, US, and other
nations’ bilateral free trade and investment agreements address capi-
tal transfers and capital controls in different ways (Shaffer and Waibel,
2015).
Even though bilateralism in trade and finance is not nearly as perva-
sive in trade and monetary affairs today as it was in the interwar period,
the rise of bilateralism in trade and investment agreements over the
last decade in particular poses challenges to both the modern trade and
monetary legal orders, and their interface. Both the trade and the mon-
etary transnational legal orders may now be past their peaks. The mon-
etary regime, whose rapid decline – compared to the former glory of
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the IMF under the Bretton Woods system – came with the transition
towards floating exchange rates by the world’s major economies, may
provide a crystal ball into the future of the trade regime.
The failure to deal with disputes between debtor
and creditor states
Post-1989, the functional differentiation between the IMF (whosemain
purposes, although they include the expansion of global trade, focus on
financial issues dealing with balance of payments imbalances) and the
WTO may have become the Achilles heel of the trade and monetary
transnational legal orders. New challenges have arisen at the interface
of the trade and monetary legal orders that neither order is able to satis-
factorily resolve, such as the issues of exchange rates and global imbal-
ances. These challenges of institutional interaction are substantially
new since the WTO, the peak organization for the trade regime, was
established only in the mid 1990s, and informal policy coordination
has become more challenging with the diffusion of economic power,
reflected in the rise of China and other emerging economies and the
relative decline of US and European economic power.
Over the last decade, global imbalances and associated allegations
of currency misalignment and manipulation have become one of the
most pressing issues facing the international community.What role can
the trade and the monetary legal orders play in ensuring the orderly
unwinding of global imbalances? This unwinding poses a major threat
to not only cross-border trade in goods and services, and cross-border
financial transactions, but to the stability of the international economic
system as a whole. Thus far the monetary and trade legal orders have
not assisted countries in alleviating these global imbalances, as actors
have considered but so far been unable or unwilling to use law for such
ends. These global imbalances are widely seen as one of the proximate
causes of the global financial crisis that started in 2008.
It is a time-honoured pattern that surplus and deficit countries tend
to disagree about the solution to global imbalances, one that goes back
to the interwar period involving disputes among debtor and surplus
countries (Meissner, 2010). Debtor countries tend to advocate multi-
lateral solutions that require creditor countries to assume some respon-
sibility for limiting global imbalances. Yet time and time again, surplus
countries, whose identity has changed over time, resist suchmoves. As a
result, we presently have no hard rules and preciously little soft law that
could help with unwinding global imbalances resulting from exchange
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rate misalignment. Germany in the interwar period, and the UK fol-
lowing World War II, adopted the position characteristic of the deficit
countries, contending that part of the burden of adjustment should fall
on surplus countries, such as the United States. At BrettonWoods, the
United States, which was the major surplus country at the end ofWorld
War II, blocked Keynes’ initiatives for multilateral rules to be intro-
duced which imposed obligations on both surplus and deficit countries
to adjust imbalances (Steil, 2013, p. 208).
In the intervening decades, the United States has become the world’s
largest deficit country, and China the world’s largest surplus country.
Not surprisingly, in the last decade, the United States has pressed the
IMF to interpret and apply IMF rules to induce China to change its
exchange rate policies so as to reduce China’s surplus, and has toyed
with the idea of imposing sanctions on China for deliberately under-
valuing its exchange rate through interventions on the currency mar-
kets. More recently, Germany has come under pressure from its Euro-
zone partners and the US government, among others, to do its part in
reducing imbalances by boosting domestic demand and investment, and
as a consequence, at least partly unwinding its sizeable trade surplus.
Because China is the largest creditor in the world and has a huge
trade surplus, China became a center of concern in the United States
during the 2000s regarding the interface of trade and monetary pol-
icy. China has actively and regularly intervened on foreign exchange
markets to stem the likely appreciation of its currency (the renminbi,
or yuan). China’s foreign exchange reserves have risen in the process
from $403 billion at the end of 2003 to over $3.3 trillion by the end of
2011 (CIA). US policy makers have responded by raising allegations of
currency manipulation, as reflected in the 2012 US political campaign
in which Republican candidateMitt Romney proclaimed that he would
declare China a currency manipulator on his first day of office.
In comparison, the relationship between the United States and
China in the trade legal order has been considerably less contentious.
The approach of China to the WTO has been largely cooperative.
As of May 2015, China has been complainant in thirteen cases, and
respondent in thirty-three cases before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Body (WTO website). The United States brought fourteen of the cases
against China. As a rule, China has complied with panel reports and
Appellate Body decisions, with the recent exception of the Publica-
tions and Audiovisual Products (WTO, DS363) where China only imple-
mented the AB’s ruling with a delay of two-and-a-half years (Zhang and
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Li, 2014). Since 2008, China has proactively used WTO dispute set-
tlement, increasingly also acting as a complainant as a result of rising
legalism and socialization (Harpaz, 2010; Huang and Ji, 2012).
The US government’s attempt to press the IMF to be more aggressive
towards China in its Article IV surveillance, aiming to induce the IMF
to pressure China to permit the renminbi to appreciate. These actions
divided IMF staff, some of whom found ‘that the US Treasury wanted
them to do its dirty work’ (Blustein, 2012, p. 11). The IMF staff felt
under considerable pressure from the US Treasury to find that renminbi
was fundamentally misaligned, allegedly even sparking remarks from
IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss Kahn that it was ‘black-
mail’ because the IMF needed Congressional votes to maintain the
Fund’s financial viability (Blustein, 2012, p. 21).
In 2007, the IMF staff prepared and the Executive Board adopted a
revision to the IMF’s surveillance guidelines, called ‘Decision on Bilat-
eral Surveillance over Member’s Policies’. Controversially, the IMF
Decision adopted ‘fundamental exchange rate misalignment’ as its key
term for surveillance, which was the very language used in a US Sen-
ate bill sponsored by Senators Charles Grassley and Max Baucus, the
Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee. The IMF Executive Board adopted the principles despite China’s
vote to the contrary, after considerable IMF and US efforts at persuad-
ing non-OECD members of the Executive Board who initially opposed
it. This 2007 Decision could be read as tempering the reference to
‘currency manipulation’ (the ‘scarlet M’ in the words of U.S. Treasury
Under Secretary Timothy Adams) (Blustein, 2012, p. 12) with the less
politically-charged language of ‘fundamental exchange rate misalign-
ment’, and to do so in the context of an open-ended, but formally bind-
ing IMF Article IV undertaking.
The Fund’s staff attempted to implement the Decision in preparing
the next Article IV report on China in September 2008, finding that
‘there are significant concerns that the exchange rate may be funda-
mentally misaligned and exchange rate policies could be a significant
contributor to external instability’. However, the IMF did not publicly
release the report in light of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers that
catalyzed the global financial crisis. It was an inopportune time to pick
a fight with China (Blustein, 2012, p. 21).
China reacted vigorously to the IMF Decision and draft surveil-
lance report. It was particularly concerned that such a report could
provide ammunition for a WTO complaint against it, as well as
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justification of unilateral protectionist measures. China stopped high-
level contacts with the IMF. The IMF eventually backed down and,
abandoned use of the term ‘fundamental misalignment’. It quickly
adopted a ‘revised operational guidance’ for its 2007 decision that it
put on its website, noting: ‘The attempt to apply exchange rate-related
“labels” – for instance the use of specific terminology such as “funda-
mental misalignment” . . . has proved an impediment to effective imple-
mentation of the Decision’. The IMF acknowledged that this episode
had been ‘damaging [to] the Fund’s credibility’ (Blustein, 2012, p. 23).
It abandoned the use of the term ‘fundamental misalignment’ and
rather used terms such as ‘under-or overvaluation’ in its ensuing country
reports under Article IV (IMF 2009, [8]).
In light of the United States failure to enlist the IMF in challenging
China’s exchange rate policy, the handling of the issue of global imbal-
ances and currency valuations shifted to the G20, reflecting the rise
of emerging economies in global governance and a move away from
international law and independent international institutions such as
the IMF. The G20 launched a new process at its Pittsburg summit in
September 2009, entitled a Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and
BalancedGrowth. Under the framework, members agreed to a multilat-
eral Mutual Assessment Process under which they identify objectives,
policies to achieve them, and a peer-review monitoring process. Posi-
tions, however, continue to divide, such as between the United States,
whichwants quantitative benchmarks and a peer-reviewmechanism for
assessing currency misalignment, and China, which resists constraints
on it. In short, law has played little role, and the turn to political order-
ing has been unsuccessful.
CONCLUSION
In the 1940s, the United States and UK took the lead in creating new
international institutions to address international monetary and trade
issues through law. They created two distinct trade and monetary legal
orders, one governing monetary affairs through the IMF, and the other
governing trade matters through the GATT. How they interact, and
how the terms of this interaction have changed over time, tells us some-
thing important about the history of economic globalization.
However, when the international economy moved towards float-
ing exchange rates and free capital mobility in the 1970s and with
increasing liberalization post-1989 with the collapse of the Berlin Wall
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symbolizing the end of the Cold War, the interface between the mon-
etary and trade legal orders became more conflicted. In particular, the
issue of exchange rates is a non-law area today, much like during the
interwar period. The fragmentation of law reflected in the rise of bilat-
eral trade and investment agreements further opens up the prospect
of conflict on the issue of capital controls, curtailing government pol-
icy space to prudentially address financial stability and to respond to
financial crises. As the monetary legal order under the IMF has become
less legalized, the trading order has become more so under the WTO
and bilateral agreements, with many of the latter guaranteeing the free
movement of capital and thus countering the implied authorization for
capital controls under the IMF Articles.
The misalignment of the two legal orders on exchange rates, in turn,
spurs demands for trade protectionism, in a global economy still deal-
ing with the hangover of the global financial crisis of 2008, much like
the overhang of debt in the interwar period that was intimately linked
to the issues of exchange rates, balance of payments, and the use of
capital controls to stem capital flight. The absence of third party dis-
pute settlement leaves the issue of exchange rate coordination entirely
to negotiations between governments. Similar to the interwar period,
both surplus and deficit countries struggle to fashion solutions in mul-
tilateral and bilateral negotiations to unwind global imbalances.
In the interwar period, the collapse of the gold standard and the
rise of currency instability affected trade and investment with a lag. A
repeat of this experience is a possibility. Dark clouds stemming from the
backlash against financial globalization are likely to hang over the con-
temporary international economic system for some time. The resilience
and adaptability of the trade and monetary legal orders are likely to
face particular challenges in the coming years. The interwar experience
points to the limits of political ordering. Diplomacy cannot substitute
for weak legal ordering in all circumstances. The shadow of interna-
tional economic law can provide useful stimulants for governments to
reach cooperative solutions to some of the gravest challenges facing the
world economy, such as global imbalances and high levels of private and
public indebtedness. But there is no guarantee that it will do so.
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